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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States and eleven other countries are currently in the end stages of 
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—the largest free trade agreement 
(FTA) in U.S. history—which incorporates a range of trade topics, including the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs).
1
 Although the 
negotiations have been highly secretive, negotiating texts of the agreement leaked as 
recently as November 2013 have suggested that the United States is proposing IPR 
provisions, specifically relating to patent protection, that are stronger and less 
                                                          
 LL.M. in International Business and Economic Law, with distinction, February 2014, 
Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., cum laude, 2007, Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law; B.G.S., 2004, University of Michigan. The author extends gratitude to the 
editors of the Journal of Law and Health for their assistance in the editing process, as well as 
Professor Jayashree Watal. The author also thanks his parents, Bonnie and Ron Silverman, for 
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 1 Alex Hern & Dominic Rushe, WikiLeaks Publishes Secret Draft Chapter of Trans-
Pacific Partnership, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/media/ 
2013/nov/13/wikileaks-trans-pacific-partnership-chapter-secret. 
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flexible than IPR provisions included within three of the four most recent U.S. 
FTAs.
2
 This paper addresses and analyzes these leaked IPR provisions and makes 
the argument that in the best interest of global welfare and public-health policy, the 
United States should not be attempting to incorporate stronger IPR protections in the 
TPP. 
Section 1 provides an introduction to the TRIPS agreement—the first 
international agreement to set minimum standards for the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs—and discusses  the significance of the “Doha Declaration” in 
helping to clarify the need to interpret TRIPS from a public-health perspective. 
Section 2 describes the recent U.S. trend of seeking levels of IPR protection in its 
FTAs that exceed the minimum standards of TRIPS (referred to as “TRIPS-plus” 
provisions)—including patent term extensions, patent linkages, and enhanced data 
protection, as detailed in Section 3 of this paper. Section 4 describes the Bipartisan 
Trade Deal (BTD) of May 10, 2007, as an attempt by members of Congress to 
address concerns about the effect that these enhanced IPR protections have on 
developing countries’ ability to access life-saving medicines. Section 5 outlines the 
leaked U.S. TPP proposals relating to patent term extensions, patent linkages and 
data protection, and describes how they will impede TPP countries from gaining 
access to medicines. In order to better understand the issues and arguments that are 
at stake from both sides, Section 6 provides the arguments commonly put forth as to 
why strong patent protection is necessary, while Section 7 examines the significance 
of generic medicines being accessible in the global marketplace. Section 8 analyzes 
these arguments and draws the conclusion that, while patent protection of 
pharmaceuticals is important, it must be fairly balanced against the needs of the 
developing world to be able to access affordable, life-saving medicines. In 
conclusion, this paper puts forth the argument that the United States should honor its 
existing global-health commitments by seeking flexible IPR standards in the TPP to 
ensure that the health interests of the poorest and sickest people in the developing 
world are not undermined by the profit-maximizing interests of pharmaceutical 
companies. 
II.  THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE “DOHA DECLARATION” 
At the center of the international IPR system is the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).
3
 TRIPS sets minimum standards of protection and enforcement for 
copyrights, trademarks, patents and other forms of intellectual property.
4
 All WTO 
member countries are required to comply with these standards by modifying their 
national regulations to be consistent with the rules of the agreement.
5
 TRIPS strikes 
a balance between the “rights of patent holders to benefit from their inventions and 
                                                          
 2 Id. 
 3 SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40607, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES 11 (2010). 
 4 Id. at 11. 
 5 Amal Nagah Elbeshbishi, TRIPS and Public Health: What Should African Countries 
Do? 49 AFRICAN TRADE POLICY CTR.  WORK IN PROGRESS 1, 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 49.pdf. 
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the rights of countries to address health priorities through the provision of affordable 
medicines.”6 
Among the debates about the implications of TRIPS is its impact on public 
health.
7
 Prior to TRIPS, developing countries regulated public health with little 
involvement from an international IPR system.
8
 Critics of TRIPS asserted that 
developed countries, which are the major producers of intellectual property, would 
be the prime beneficiaries of the agreement.
9
 Opponents also argued that TRIPS 
would raise the costs of public-health goods, constrain the ability of governments to 
provide health services to their populations, and hinder innovation and economic 
development for low-income countries.
10
 In an effort to alleviate developing 
countries’ concerns with TRIPS, trade ministers adopted a Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (the “Doha Declaration”) committing WTO member 
states to “interpret and implement the agreement to support public health and to 
promote access to medicines for all.”11 
The Doha Declaration was an important step toward making TRIPS more 
development friendly and emphasizing the need to interpret TRIPS from a public-
health perspective.
12
 Specifically, the Doha Declaration clarified that TRIPS does 
not and should not prevent WTO members from taking measures to protect public 
health.
13
 The IPR flexibilities allowed under TRIPS and the Doha Declaration are 
internationally recognized as important public policy and legal tools in the efforts to 
protect public health and promote access to medicines in the developing world.
14
  
                                                          
 6 Ruth Lopert & Deborah Gleeson, The High Price of “Free” Trade: U.S. Trade 
Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 200 (2013). 
 7 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 12. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 13. 
 12 Elbeshbishi, supra note 5, at 3. 
 13 Id.  
 14 MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, INT’L ACCESS CAMPAIGN, TRADING AWAY HEALTH: HOW 
THE U.S.’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEMANDS FOR THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT THREATEN ACCESS TO MEDICINES 5 (Aug. 2012), http://aids 2012.msf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/TPP-Issue-Brief-IAC-July2012.pdf  [hereinafter Trading Away 
Health]. A WTO case illustrating the flexibility available in TRIPS involved a dispute 
between Canada and the European Communities on the “Bolar” exception, allowing generic 
drug manufacturers to produce, and/or import and use, quantities of a patented product 
necessary to conduct tests needed to obtain regulatory approval before the expiration of a 
patent. Under TRIPS, governments can make limited exceptions to patent rights, provided 
certain conditions are met. These exceptions cannot “unreasonably” conflict with the 
“normal” exploitation of the patent and must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interest of third parties (Article 
30). This provision covers a range of exceptions. For example, there are countries that provide 
for a “research” or “experimental use” exception to allow researchers to use a patented 
invention more fully. In addition, Article 30 permits countries to allow manufacturers of 
generic drugs to use a patented invention without the patent owner’s permission and before 
the patent protection expires for the purpose of obtaining marketing approval from public-
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III.  “TRIPS-PLUS” IN U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
In recent years, the United States has increasingly focused on FTAs as a tool to 
promote stronger international IPR protections.
15
 In negotiating FTAs since the 
implementation of TRIPS, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has 
frequently sought levels of IPR protection that exceed the minimum standards of 
TRIPS (so-called “TRIPS-plus” provisions).16 These new and higher IPR standards 
arguably favor the short-term business interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies at 
the expense of public-health interests in developing countries.
17
 
The United States’ pursuit of TRIPS-plus protections for pharmaceutical patents 
in recent FTAs is well recognized.
18
 This pursuit has been driven, at least in part, by 
a desire to achieve levels of protection it anticipated from TRIPS but failed to 
secure.
19
 The U.S. pharmaceutical industry viewed TRIPS as falling short of its 
objectives, and as a result, there has generally been a progressive increase in IPR 
protection for pharmaceuticals in U.S. FTAs since TRIPS.
20
 
Proponents of stronger IPR provisions in FTAs argue that they ultimately 
promote access to medicines for developing countries by encouraging innovation.
21
 
However, the incorporation of TRIPS-plus provisions in recent U.S. FTAs has 
attracted criticism from public-health advocates and developing countries, which 
have expressed concerns that the enhanced protections run contrary to the spirit of 
the Doha Declaration and severely limit access to life-saving medicines in the 
developing world.
22
 Both of these arguments are addressed in greater detail in 
Section 8 of this paper. 
                                                          
health authorities—thereby allowing generic producers to market their versions almost as soon 
as the patent expires. This provision, sometimes called the “regulatory exception” or “Bolar” 
provision, has been upheld as conforming to TRIPS in a WTO dispute ruling. In a report 
adopted on April 7, 2000, a WTO dispute-settlement panel stated that Canadian law was 
consistent with TRIPS in allowing manufacturers to do so. Elbeshbishi, supra note 5, at 4. 
 15 SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34292, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 24 (2011). 
 16 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 20. 
 17 Elbeshbishi, supra note 5, at 6. 
 18 Lopert &Gleeson, supra note 6, at 199. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 21. 
 22 Id. at 20. The impact of TRIPS-plus provisions has been demonstrated in empirical 
studies. For example, Oxfam determined that the imposition of TRIPS-plus provisions in the 
Jordan-U.S. FTA resulted in a twenty percent overall increase in medicine prices between 
2001 and 2006, and led to the delayed introduction of generic equivalents for seventy-nine 
percent of new medicines produced by twenty-one pharmaceutical companies between 2002 
and mid-2006. Lopert and Gleeson, supra note 6, at 202. 
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IV.  PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS, PATENT LINKAGES, AND DATA PROTECTION 
The most prominent TRIPS-plus patent provisions in U.S. FTAs are patent term 
extensions, patent linkages, and data protection.
23
 
Patent Term Extensions.  Many U.S. FTAs include provisions for mandatory 
patent term extensions beyond the TRIPS obligation of patent protection terms of 
twenty years from the filing date.
24
 Extensions are allowed in cases of 
“unreasonable” delays in the issuance of patents due to the regulatory review or 
administrative process.
25
 Patent holders contend that such extensions allow them to 
recoup the costs of research and development (R&D) of new products, while critics 
argue such extensions delay the entry of generic drugs into the marketplace.
26
 
Patent Linkages.   Patent linkage refers to the attachment of regulatory approval 
for the marketing of a drug with the status of a patent.
27
 If a patent exists, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its counterparts in other countries may 
only grant marketing approval for a generic drug that is patented in the country with 
the permission of the patent holder.
28
 Patent linkage is a common provision in U.S. 
FTAs.
29
 Patent linkage is considered to be TRIPS-plus because under TRIPS generic 
drug manufacturers are able to apply for marketing approval without the patent 
owner’s permission and prior to the expiration of the patent, thereby reducing the 
time it takes for the generic drugs to enter the marketplace once the patent expires.
30
 
Data Protection.  To bring a patented drug to market, a pharmaceutical company 
must demonstrate through costly clinical trials that the drug is both safe and 
effective.
31
 In cases where the patent holders must submit undisclosed data regarding 
                                                          
 23 ILIAS & FERGUSSON, supra note 15, at 26. Other prominent TRIPS-plus provisions 
include compulsory licensing and parallel importation. A compulsory license is a government 
authorization for third parties (such as a company or the government itself) for the 
manufacture or use of a product under patent without the permission of the rights-holder. 
TRIPS permits signatories to issue compulsory licenses for patented devices and provide 
compensation to the owner of the patent and does not limit the situations in which such 
licenses may be issued. The third party must have attempted to obtain permission from the 
patent holder; however, this requirement is waived in times of national emergency or other 
extenuating circumstances. Id. at 27. Parallel importation refers to goods imported into a 
country without permission of the rights-holder after those goods were legitimately sold 
elsewhere. Some developing countries contend that this practice is an alternative method for 
governments to increase access to medicines in the absence of a compulsory license. 
Pharmaceutical companies have voiced concerns that parallel importation threatens their 
ability to engage in price differentiation between different markets. Id. at 28. 
 24 Id. at 26. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 27. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32540, THE U.S.-PANAMA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT 22 (2012). 
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the safety or effectiveness of these drugs in order to market them, TRIPS requires 
WTO members to take measures to protect such data from disclosure and unfair 
commercial use; TRIPS does not prescribe any specific time period for this 
protection.
32
 However, recent U.S. FTAs generally require a five-year period of 
marketing exclusivity for the patent holder, which typically begins from the date the 
product is approved in the country.
33
 Under this TRIPS-plus provision, generic drug 
manufacturers wanting to market and distribute their drug while the data exclusivity 
period is in effect must conduct their own clinical trials and submit their own 
findings to the national drug regulatory authority (they cannot rely on the findings 
submitted by the patent holder).
34
 Increased data protection/exclusivity, therefore, 
raises the cost of manufacturing generic drugs and delays access to these drugs.
35
 
V.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL 
The steady increase of IPR protections in U.S. FTAs that occurred after TRIPS 
saw a change in 2007 with the implementation of the Bipartisan Trade Deal (BTD).
36
 
In May 2007, Congress and the Bush Administration concluded a bipartisan 
agreement on trade policy that addressed some members’ concerns about the 
implications of enhanced IPRs on the ability of developing countries to meet public-
health needs.
37
 In particular, Democrats in Congress sought to ensure that pending 
FTAs allowed trading partners the flexibility to meet their international IPR 
protection and enforcement obligations while being able to promote access to life-
saving medicines.
38
 The BTD allowed developing countries flexibility in the 
application of the three TRIPS-plus provisions described in Section 3 above—patent 
term extensions, patent linkages, and data protection—where necessary to protect 
                                                          
 32 Id. at 27. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 202. 
 37 ILIAS & FERGUSSON, supra note 15, at 25. 
 38 Id.  
The administration’s agreement with the Congressional leadership preserves a strong 
overall level of protection for intellectual property in developing country free trade 
agreements, including those most recently notified to Congress. Within this overall 
framework of strong intellectual property protection, the agreement reached with the 
Congressional leadership aims to incorporate certain flexibilities. These modifications 
are aimed at further ensuring that developing country free trade agreement partners are 
able to achieve an appropriate balance between fostering innovation in, and promoting 
access to, life-saving medicines. The results are fully in line with this Administration’s 
long-standing trade policy objectives in the area of intellectual property.  
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/ 2007/asset_upload_file127_ 
11319.pdf [hereinafter BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL]. 
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public health.
39
 This flexibility has been incorporated in the recent U.S. FTAs with 
Peru, Panama and Colombia in the following ways:  
 Patent term extensions for pharmaceutical products are optional, 
rather than mandatory. 
 Marketing approval for a generic drug is not tied with the patent 
status of its brand-name drug. 
 Data exclusivity terms of five years may be reduced by a 
minimum of six months in practice.
40
 
For example, under the Panama FTA, if a company files to market a new drug in 
Panama after making an initial filing in another country, such as the United States, 
and Panama approves the drug within six months of that filing, the data exclusivity 
term begins at the time the drug was approved in the United States, not Panama.
41
 
This provision is intended to speed up the entry of generics into Panama’s market by 
encouraging drug companies and foreign governments to engage in the approval 
process as quickly and efficiently as possible.
42
 Because this “six-month rule” 
effectively reduces the data exclusivity term in Panama, drug companies are 
encouraged to file as soon as possible to maximize the time their data may be 
                                                          
 39 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 202. The BTD entailed the following flexibilities 
with regard to IPR protections: 
 Clarification that the period of protection for test data for 
pharmaceuticals by developing country FTA partners will generally not 
extend beyond the period that such protection is available for the same 
product in the United States, coupled with a provision that will encourage 
our partners to process marketing approval applications for innovative drugs 
in a timely manner. 
 Clarification that developing country FTA partners may implement 
exceptions to normal rules for protecting test data if necessary to protect 
public health. 
 A more flexible approach, for developing country partners, to 
restoring patent terms to compensate for processing delays. This flexibility 
is accompanied by new provisions stipulating that trading partners will 
make best efforts to process patent and marketing approval applications 
expeditiously. 
 More flexibility in terms of the types of procedures that developing 
country partners may implement to prevent the marketing of patent-
infringing products. 
 Integration within the intellectual property chapter of a recognition 
that nothing in the chapter affects the ability of our FTA partners to take 
necessary measures to protect public health by promoting access to 
medicines for all, and a statement affirming mutual commitment to the 2001 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL, supra note 37, at 3. 
 40 ILIAS & FERGUSSON, supra note 15, at 27. 
 41 HORNBECK, supra note 31, at 22. 
 42 Id. 
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protected in Panama after receiving market approval.
43
 Countries are therefore 
encouraged to put in place an efficient drug-certification process because they must 
approve within the sixth-month rule to benefit from it.
44
 
Despite the BTD’s purpose of easing IPR protection, in an effort to balance the 
pharmaceutical companies’ interests with the need for greater access to affordable 
medicines in the developing world, Congress noted that the intellectual property 
chapters of U.S. trade agreements would nevertheless continue to “represent an 
enhancement of IPR protection for pharmaceutical products in those markets” by 
continuing to: protect pharmaceutical test data; require the establishment of 
procedures for patent holders to effectively enforce their rights against infringing 
products; limit grounds for patent revocation; and retain the option for patent term 
extension to be applied in cases of unreasonable delays.
45
 The extent to which the 
IPR provisions in the BTD will serve as a future template is unclear—specifically, 
whether or not these standards will be used for all future FTAs or if they will be used 
according to the income status of the United States’ trading partners.46 For instance, 
while the IPR provisions of the BTD were incorporated into the free trade 
agreements with Peru, Panama and Colombia (low-income/developing countries),
47
 
the United States did not significantly scale down the patent protections in its recent 
trade agreement with South Korea (a middle-income/developed country)
48—despite 
South Korean per capita GDP being little more than half that of the United States.
49
 
Some stakeholders have encouraged Congress to reconsider the IPR provisions in 
the BTD as they relate to current and future FTA negotiations.
50
 Specifically, the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry has aggressively lobbied against the IPR provisions in 
the BTD being incorporated within the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
negotiations,
51
 as discussed in Section 5 below. On the other hand, global-health 
advocates and producers of generic medicines have largely embraced the BTD and 
encouraged even further weakening of patent protections in an effort to increase 
access to medicines.
52
 
VI.  PHARMACEUTICAL IPRS IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP  
The United States is presently in the final stages of negotiating the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)—a free trade agreement encompassing twelve countries that will 
                                                          
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. In addition, there is language in the intellectual property chapter of the U.S.-Panama 
FTA stating that, in cases of epidemics, extreme urgency, or national emergency, a waiver 
from the data exclusivity laws would be allowed. Id. 
 45 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 202. 
 46 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 26. 
 47 Id. 
 48 ILIAS & FERGUSSON, supra note 15, at 25. 
 49 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 202. 
 50 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 26. 
 51 Trading Away Health, supra note 14, at 8. 
 52 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 26. 
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“set the standard for 21st-century trade agreements going forward.”53 The TPP text 
will likely become the template for future U.S. trade agreements with the capacity to 
set “de facto global standards.”54 
U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has signaled that the United States is 
leaning toward an approach in TPP negotiations that would establish more flexible 
pharmaceutical IPR protections for developing countries than for developed 
countries.
55
 In remarks on October 29, 2013, Froman invoked the BTD as support 
for IPR flexibility within the agreement, stating “[w]hat the [BTD] signaled was that 
there are developed countries, there are developing countries, and there are 
approaches that may strike that balance between ensuring access to medicines on one 
hand and ensuring strong protection for innovation on the other.”56 
There has long been speculation that the United States may ultimately settle on 
an approach in TPP that applies more flexible IPR standards to developing countries 
than to developed ones.
57
 One U.S. industry source indicated that brand-name drug 
manufacturers would not reject such a proposal outright, as long as developing 
countries would be required to meet higher IPR standards at a later date.
58
  
However, leaked drafts
59
 of the U.S. negotiating positions in the TPP suggest that 
the United States may be backing away from the more flexible IPR standards under 
the BTD and demanding more aggressive IPR protections.
60
 Most recently, a leaked 
version of the TPP chapter on intellectual property (published on November 13, 
                                                          
 53 Trading Away Health, supra note 14, at 1. The TPP countries currently negotiating are 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. South Korea and Taiwan have expressed interest 
in joining TPP negotiations. Srinivasa Madhur, China-Japan-Korea FTA: A Dual Track 
Approach to a Trilateral Agreement, 28 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 376, 381 (2013). 
 54 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 20607. 
 55 Froman Signals Flexible Approach to Drug IP in TPP, Hatch Opposes, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-
11/01/2013/froman-signals-flexible-approach-to-drug-ip-in-tpp-hatch-opposes/menu-id-
710.html [hereinafter Froman Signals]. 
 56 Id. Senate Finance Committee ranking member Orrin Hatch (R-UT) took issue with 
Froman’s position at an October 30, 2013, hearing. Hatch disagreed with Froman’s notion that 
there is a tension between strong intellectual property protections for drugs and ensuring 
access to medicines, stating: “[t]o the contrary, strong intellectual property spurs innovation 
and is therefore essential to providing access to innovative medicines.” Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 The TPP has largely been conducted in secrecy; the negotiating texts have not been 
made available for public consumption, and Congress has had relatively limited access to the 
texts, as compared to trade agreement negotiations under previous Administrations. 
 60 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 208; Trading Away Health, supra note 14, at 1. 
Speaking the same day as the leak, Froman repeatedly emphasized that the United States is 
trying to promote access to medicines as well as protect innovation through the TPP 
negotiations. Matthew Schewel, Leaked TPP IP Chapter Reveals Details of Conflicting Drug 
Proposals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 14, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-
Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-11/15/2013/leaked-tpp-ip-chapter-reveals-details-of-conflicting-
drug-proposals/menu-id-710.html. 
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2013, by the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks) reveals the details of a counterproposal 
on pharmaceutical IPR protections tabled by five TPP countries
61
 that omits three 
protections for pharmaceutical IPRs that are known to be significant pieces of the 
U.S. proposals in TPP.
62
 Not surprisingly, these proposals involve patent term 
extensions, patent linkages and data protection.
63
 The following is a discussion of the 
U.S. proposals with regard to these three IPR protections within TPP (as gleaned 
from leaked negotiating texts), including their potential impact on restricting access 
to medicines in TPP countries. 
A.  Proposal #1 – Patent Term Extensions 
The United States’ proposal in the TPP would require countries to grant patent 
term extensions of at least five years to compensate for administrative delays in the 
regulatory or patent approval process.
64
 Even though the BTD recognized the 
negative impact of patent term extensions on access to medicines, and made them 
optional for countries negotiating trade agreements with the United States, the 
United States is proposing that patent term extensions in the TPP be mandatory.
65
 
Patent term extensions will create extra years in which a patent holder can maintain a 
monopoly position and continue to charge artificially high prices for a drug, free 
from generic competition, thereby further delaying the entry of affordable medicines 
into the marketplace of TPP countries.
66
  
B.  Proposal #2 – Patent Linkages 
The United States has proposed that patent linkage be required of TPP countries, 
thereby imposing restrictive conditions for the registration of generic medicines in 
developing TPP countries and creating a new and burdensome role for national 
regulatory authorities.
67
 With this proposal, the United States is reneging on the 
BTD, which made patent linkage optional for countries negotiating trade agreements 
with the United States.
68
 Patent linkage provisions will delay the entry of generics 
into TPP countries.
69
 By requiring regulatory authorities to police patents, patent 
linkages “hinder generic drug registration while circumventing patent dispute 
processes between the patent holder and the patent authorities.”70  
                                                          
 61 These countries are Canada, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Schewel, 
supra note 60. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Trading Away Health, supra note 14, at 13. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 14. 
 70 Id.  
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C.  Proposal #3 – Data Protection 
The United States has proposed at least five years of data exclusivity for new 
chemical entities and at least three years of data exclusivity for drugs containing an 
already approved active ingredient.
71
 U.S. pharmaceutical companies have lobbied 
for the data exclusivity period for “biologics” to be set at a minimum of twelve 
years.
72
 Because biologics are structured differently than traditional chemical 
medicines, they require a different regulatory approval process.
73
 This would be the 
first time the United States has included a proposal on biologics in a trade 
agreement.
74
 If included within the TPP, such a proposal would severely delay the 
entry of “biosimilars” (generic biologics) into the marketplace.75 It is unclear if the 
United States will adhere to the flexible IPR protections included in the BTD and 
trade agreements with Peru, Colombia, and Panama (as discussed in Section 4 
above), including the “six-month rule” and allowances for data exclusivity waivers 
in cases of epidemics and other national health emergencies.
76
  
Data exclusivity for biologics will result in higher prices and delay the 
introduction of affordable, generic versions of these medications in TPP countries.
77
 
Examples of these effects have been shown in instances where data exclusivity 
provisions were implemented in national laws.
78
 Jordan implemented data 
exclusivity under its FTA with the United States.
79
 A 2007 study found that of 103 
medicines registered and launched since 2001 that had no patent protection in 
Jordan, at least seventy-nine percent had no competition from a generic equivalent as 
a consequence of data exclusivity.
80
 The study also found that prices of these drugs 
were up to eight hundred percent higher than in neighboring Egypt.
81
 A 2010 study 
determined that once Guatemala enacted data exclusivity, some drug prices rose as 
much as 846%.
82
 In the United States, the price of colchicine (a treatment used 
mainly for gout) rose more than 5000% after data exclusivity was enacted.
83
  
                                                          
 71 Id. at 12. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. Some members of Congress oppose the inclusion of data exclusivity relating to 
biologics in the TPP. The Federal Trade Commission has recommended eliminating data 
exclusivity for biologics in the United States. Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. Colchicine has been in use for thousands of years, costs little to produce, and cannot 
be patented. Therefore, generic versions of the drug have been widely available since the 
nineteenth century. However, a new monopoly on colchicine was created in 2009 when the 
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VII.  WHY PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IS IMPORTANT 
A patent is a “time-limited, legal, exclusive right granted for the invention of new 
products, processes, organisms, designs, and plants that allows the right holder to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention for a period of 
twenty years.”84 The financial returns generated by the exclusive monopolies 
provided by patents are believed to enable pharmaceutical companies to recoup the 
costs of R&D, earn profits, and invest in future innovations.
85
 As such, the 
pharmaceutical industry is dependent on the protection of patents.
86
 
New drugs cost pharmaceutical companies approximately one billion dollars to 
discover, develop, and gain regulatory approval.
87
 R&D is costly in the 
pharmaceutical industry because most drug candidates fail to reach the market—less 
than one percent of the compounds examined in pre-clinical stages are cleared for 
testing on humans.
88
 Moreover, manufacturing plants are expensive (costing between 
fifty million and two hundred million dollars), and unique manufacturing 
requirements usually mean they are suitable for only one product.
89
 All of these 
R&D costs are compensated for by the profits generated from patent-protected 
products.
90
 
Without patent protection, imitators can “free-ride” on the innovator’s regulatory 
approval and duplicate the drugs for a small fraction of what it cost to produce the 
original.
91
 Imitators of the original drug (generics) need only demonstrate that there 
is “bioequivalence” to the original brand in order to receive market registration.92 
This process costs one million to two million dollars and takes only a few years.
93
 
The prospect of success for generics is very likely, as reflected by the fact that many 
                                                          
FDA accepted clinical data from a one-week trial of the drug and granted data exclusivity to a 
leading pharmaceutical company, URL Pharma. That company subsequently sued to force 
other manufacturers off the market and raised prices from $0.09 to $4.85 per pill. Id. 
 84 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 85 Id. at 4. Dave Ricks, senior vice president at Eli Lilly, stated “[n]ew products come 
from the incentive to develop them through the promise of rewards through intellectual 
property . . . Without those rewards, it’s difficult to see where those new medicines would 
come from to begin with.” Froman Signals, supra note 55. 
 86 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 87 EMMANUEL HASSAN, OHID YAQUB, & STEPHANIE DIEPEVEEN, RAND CORP., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 26 
(2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/ 
RAND_TR804.pdf. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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generics typically receive FDA approval and enter the market within a short period 
of time after the patent expires on the original drug.
94
 
VIII.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENERIC MEDICINES 
Generic medicines—copies of patented drugs whose patents have typically 
expired—help to lower the price of pharmaceuticals in the global marketplace.95 As 
stated previously, generic manufacturers do not generally have to repeat research and 
clinical trials conducted by the originating pharmaceutical companies in order to 
obtain regulatory approval, but rather only need to demonstrate the “bioequivalence” 
of their product to the original, patented drug.
96
 Without this requirement, generic 
medicines are able to enter the market more quickly and at lower prices once the 
patents have expired.
97
 Generic medicines also play the role of market competitors, 
encouraging brand-name pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of their 
drugs and possibly develop newer, improved drugs.
98
 
“In the field of health, generic competition saves lives.”99 The price of HIV 
treatment has dropped ninety-nine percent over the last ten years (from over ten 
thousand dollars for one year’s treatment in 2000, to less than one hundred fifty 
dollars per person, per year today) as a result of generic-drug production in India, 
Brazil, and Thailand, where these drugs were not patented.
100
 By 2008, more than 
eighty percent of donor-funded purchases of anti-retroviral drugs for use in 
developing countries were generic drugs from India, including ninety-one percent of 
those formulated for children.
101
 This effect on drug prices has been crucial in 
expanding HIV/AIDS treatment to more than eight million people in the developing 
world.
102
 
All of the prominent international treatment initiatives for developing 
countries
103
 rely on affordable generic drugs as a critical component of their 
sustainable treatment programs.
104
 In 2010, the United States President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) saved $380 million through the purchase of generic 
versus originator anti-retroviral drugs.
105
 More than eighty percent of AIDS drugs 
                                                          
 94 Id. at 2627. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Trading Away Health, supra note 14, at 4. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. These initiatives include the Global Fund, PEPFAR, UNITAID, and UNICEF. Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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that Médecins Sans Frontières
106
 uses across the world are generics from India.
107
 
The organization also uses generic drugs to treat malaria, tuberculosis, and a range of 
other infectious diseases in developing countries.
108
 
IX.  PATENT PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
The preceding sections of this paper presented arguments commonly put forward 
by the pharmaceutical industry to support stronger patent protection—specifically, 
that such protection is necessary because it allows pharmaceutical companies to 
recoup R&D costs and create profits that in turn spur pharmaceutical innovation. 
This section analyzes this argument and concludes that stronger patent protection of 
pharmaceuticals fails to encourage innovation in the developing world and serves to 
further impede access to medicines.
109
 
The argument that stronger patent protection is necessary to stimulate innovation, 
thereby leading to better global-health outcomes, is both overemphasized and 
misrepresented.
110
 This argument is overemphasized in that increased spending on 
R&D does not necessarily result in “genuine innovation.”111 Many new drugs 
promoted by the pharmaceutical industry as innovations are actually “me-too” 
drugs—minor structural modifications to existing drugs that offer little or no 
additional benefit as compared to the original.
112
 This practice of developing “me-
too” drugs lends support to the argument that enhanced patent protection may 
actually discourage true innovation by creating financial incentives for insignificant 
changes to existing drugs.
113
 
The argument that stronger patent protection stimulates innovation, thereby 
leading to better global-health outcomes, is misrepresented in that the evidence for 
this argument exists primarily in the developed world.
114
 While there is a correlation 
between stronger patent protection and R&D/innovation for drug which treat 
diseases that are prevalent in wealthy countries, research has shown that this 
correlation does not exist for the development of drugs to treat diseases that 
primarily affect the developing world (so-called “neglected diseases”).115 
Less than ten percent of global spending on health R&D is directed toward the 
major health problems of ninety percent of the world’s population—often referred to 
as the “10/90 gap.”116 Low rates of R&D investment in neglected diseases may be 
                                                          
 106 Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) is an international humanitarian 
organization that delivers emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, 
natural disasters, and exclusion from health care in nearly seventy countries. Id. 
 107 Id. at 1. 
 108 Id. 
 109 HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 87, at xvxvi. 
 110 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 210. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 87, at xvi. 
 115 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 210. 
 116 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 5. 
2014] FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS 229 
 
 
 
one of many factors contributing to poor health conditions in developing 
countries.
117
 Some neglected tropical diseases are common in the developing world 
as a result of poverty-related conditions—including poor sanitation, unsafe drinking 
water, and a lack of basic health-care infrastructure.
118
  
Funding for neglected diseases has increased in recent years; however, to 
attribute this increase to stronger IPR protection is difficult because other factors are 
likely to have played a more prominent role.
119
 When it was first identified in 1990, 
the “10/90 gap” led to considerable media exposure, political momentum, and 
increased research with regard to a few high-profile diseases.
120
 This rise in R&D 
was arguably due to increased funding by the philanthropic sector, not the private 
sector.
121
 In 2007, only nine percent of neglected-disease funding came from the 
private sector.
122
 Therefore, while funding for neglected diseases has increased in 
recent years, this increase can be primarily attributed to public and philanthropic 
efforts focused on a few diseases in the public spotlight, rather than to strengthened 
IPRs catalyzing private-sector funding for neglected diseases.
123
 
The premise behind the pharmaceutical industry’s argument that stronger patent 
protection spurs innovation only holds true in situations where “markets offer 
sufficient financial incentives for a return on investment.”124 Many developing 
countries simply cannot provide this type of market; therefore, the financial 
incentive for pharmaceutical companies is non-existent.
125
 In light of this 
understanding and the evidence to support it, the premise that the public health of 
developing countries will benefit in the long term from stronger IPRs today 
ultimately fails.
126
 
X.  CONCLUSION 
One-third of the global population does not have access to essential medicines.
127
 
In the poorest parts of Asia and Africa, this statistic is closer to fifty percent.
128
 
                                                          
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 87at 32. 
 120 Id. By 2004, there were sixty-three neglected-disease projects. Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 3233. 
 124 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 4. 
 125 Id. As the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Public Health 
concluded in 2006: “for diseases affecting millions of poor people in developing countries, 
patents are not a relevant factor or effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to 
the market.” Trading Away Health, supra note 12, at 7. 
 126 “Assertions are often made about the advantages of TRIPS-plus protection but there has 
been little evidence of the beneficial effects of TRIPS-plus measures either in the form of 
increased foreign investment or increased innovation.” Trading Away Health, supra note 12, 
at 18 (citing U.N.D.P. & U.N.A.I.D.S, ISSUE BRIEF, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH (2012)). 
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Stronger patent protection not only fails to stimulate innovation that benefits the 
health of these people, it impedes their access to medicines by raising the costs of 
drugs and delaying the entry of generics into the global marketplace.
129
 For those 
who rarely have health insurance, and often pay for drugs out of their own pockets, 
lack of access to affordable medicines can be the difference between life and 
death.
130
 When patent protections are eased, competition between drug 
manufacturers allows for the poorest and sickest people in the world to have greater 
access to affordable and life-saving medicines.
131
 The public-health effect in the 
developing world created by this improved access is hard to overstate, as detailed in 
Section VIII of this paper. If through the TPP negotiations the United States is 
successful in reneging on the patent flexibilities included in the BTD, it will 
undoubtedly lead to restricted access to medicines—and ultimately deficient public-
health outcomes—in the developing world.132  
The leaked IPR proposals offered by the United States during TPP negotiations 
do not only threaten access to affordable medicines worldwide, they also 
compromise international public-health safeguards and U.S. global-health 
commitments.
133
 Along with the Doha Declaration and the IPR flexibilities included 
in the BTD, an increase in international patent protection in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership undermines other U.S. commitments to ensuring affordable access to 
life-saving medicines, including the following: 
 The Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property (2008 World Health 
Assembly Resolution 61.21), in which the United States agreed, 
that countries are required to “take into account, where 
appropriate, the impact on public health when considering 
adopting or implementing more extensive intellectual property 
protection than required by TRIPS.”134 
 The 2011 UN Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS requires UN 
members, including the United States, to “ensure that intellectual 
property rights provisions in trade agreements do not undermine 
[TRIPS] flexibilities.”135 
                                                          
 128 Id. 
 129 ILIAS, supra note 3, at 6. 
 130 Trading Away Health, supra note 14, at 5. 
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 132 Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 211. “We are concerned . . . that the balance is once 
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 The Obama Administration has declared ending the AIDS 
epidemic a policy goal through initiatives such as PEPFAR and 
The Global Fund.
136
 However, without continued access to new 
and affordable generic drugs, this goal will be unreachable.
137
 
In both principle and practice, it is necessary for pharmaceutical innovations to 
be encouraged and patent-protected. However, this necessity is not absolute and 
should be balanced with the interests of global welfare. The objective of increasing 
pharmaceutical profits, with the expectation that such financial returns will 
eventually trickle down to the poorest and sickest on Earth in the form of life-saving 
medicines, has not been accomplished and is bad public policy going forward.
138
 In 
order to facilitate access to affordable medicines in the developing world and comply 
with its international public-health commitments, the United States should not 
impose increased IPR protections in the Trans-Pacific Partnership; at a minimum, it 
should honor the IPR flexibilities incorporated within the Bipartisan Trade Deal and 
the spirit of the Doha Declaration.
139
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